Two Models of Sahelian Multilateralism – What Faye and Traoré Tell Us About the New Multilateralism

Across the Sahel, the meaning and practice of multilateralism are being fundamentally reconfigured. The international partnerships that once anchored regional governance are now questioned, contested, and reframed by a new generation of leaders. This shift does not imply disengagement from the world but rather the emergence of new approaches to sovereignty, development, and global alignment. Recent statements by Senegal’s President Bassirou Diomaye Faye and the governing posture of Burkina Faso under Ibrahim Traoré vividly illustrate two of the most consequential models currently shaping this transformation.

Faye’s appeal for the revitalization of global institutions, particularly the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), positions Senegal within the normative architecture of rules-based international governance. By contrast, Burkina Faso’s withdrawal from the ICC and embrace of “win-win” cooperation with non-Western partners signals a pragmatic, sovereignty-first reinterpretation of multilateral relations. These contrasting visions are not simply ideological divergences, instead they reflect deeper structural changes in West Africa’s political landscape and carry significant implications for the region’s global posture.

Faye’s Logic of Rules-based Renewal

President Faye’s stance rests on a belief that global institutions, though imperfect, remain essential to both regional stability and national sovereignty. When he argues that peace requires multilateralism to rediscover its “foundations” of shared responsibility and universal justice, he positions Senegal as a defender of the international rule-based architecture. This position is not accidental. Senegal has a long tradition of constitutional continuity, legalist diplomacy, and proactive engagement with multilateral institutions, from peacekeeping to international mediation.

By pledging to strengthen the ICC and uphold the statutes of international courts, Faye underscores a model of sovereignty that is intertwined with institutional legitimacy. His administration’s approach signals confidence that Senegal’s interests are better served by reforming global governance than by abandoning it. This stance enhances Senegal’s credibility with international partners and supports a domestic narrative of responsible statecraft at a time when parts of the region are distancing themselves from externally designed governance norms.

Such rules-based renewal also reinforces Senegal’s strategic positioning as a stable hub in an increasingly volatile region. As major energy projects take-off within the country, and as ECOWAS confronts internal fractures, Senegal’s commitment to institutional multilateralism provides a counterweight to internal pressures shaping the region.

Traore’s Stance of Sovereignty-First Multilateralism

Burkina Faso under Captain Traoré offers a sharply contrasting model, grounded in skepticism toward Western-led institutions and a conviction that genuine sovereignty requires reimagining the very architecture of multilateral cooperation. Traoré’s government frames the withdrawal from the ICC as a necessary step in rejecting “neocolonial repression,” recasting global institutions as instruments of external constraint rather than guarantors of justice.

Yet Burkina Faso is not embracing isolationism. Instead, it advances a form of sovereignty-first multilateralism anchored in South–South diplomacy and direct material cooperation. Partnerships with China, Russia, and other non-Western actors are pursued not for ideological reasons but for their capacity to accelerate technology transfer, industrial capability, and security autonomy. Essentially, it bases its external relations not on ideology but on interests that yield viable developmental dividends. The assembly of electric vehicles in Ouaga 2000, supported by Chinese training and technical expertise, exemplifies the developmental logic animating this foreign policy orientation.

This model prioritizes outcomes over norms. It treats multilateralism as a mechanism for capacity-building and strategic autonomy in which success is measured not in compliance with global governance standards but in tangible developmental and security gains. Traoré’s approach thus challenges older definitions of regional order, pushing West Africa toward a more pluralistic system in which alternative partnerships compete with traditional Western influence.

Shared Structural Dynamics in Divergent Visions

Despite their surface-level contrast, the approaches of Senegal and Burkina Faso emerge from remarkably similar structural pressures. Both reflect a growing regional dissatisfaction with Western-led institutions, whose legitimacy has eroded amid perceptions of selective enforcement, slow delivery, or inadequate sensitivity to African priorities. The younger political elites now shaping Sahelian governance often view sovereignty as the cornerstone of legitimacy, whether exercised through institutional reform or revolutionary realignment.

Economic expectations also play a decisive role. Across the region, populations demand tangible improvements in infrastructure, industry, and employment. While Senegal seeks these through stability and access to global capital markets, Burkina Faso pursues them through direct technical cooperation with non-Western partners. In both cases, development is no longer framed as a long-term aspiration but a measure of state effectiveness and sovereignty itself.

These transformations reflect a broader reinterpretation of what multilateralism should provide. Rather than serving as a normative horizon of rights and responsibilities, multilateralism is increasingly assessed through its capacity to enhance national agency. Whether through rules-based reform or sovereignty-first pragmatism, states are attempting to reposition themselves within an evolving international order that is less hierarchical and more multipolar.

Assessing Effectiveness and Sustainability

Evaluating the effectiveness of these two models requires attention to their internal coherence and long-term sustainability. Senegal’s approach benefits from institutional continuity and international credibility, factors that support investor confidence and diplomatic influence. Its challenge lies in balancing external commitments with domestic expectations for a more assertive, sovereignty-conscious foreign policy. Should the rule-based architecture fail to reform, Senegal may find itself constrained by the very institutions it seeks to uphold.

Burkina Faso’s model, by contrast, delivers rapid developmental partnerships and strong sovereignty rhetoric, both of which resonate with domestic audiences. Its vulnerability lies in the potential for new dependencies and the absence of institutional safeguards associated with global legal frameworks. If South–South partnerships fail to translate into durable industrial capacity, the model’s legitimacy may weaken.

The evolving posture of the United States under President Trump’s second term further complicates the effectiveness and sustainability of both approaches. Trump’s renewed skepticism toward multilateral frameworks – exemplified by the sanctioning of ICC judges, threats to delegitimize the institution, the escalation of tariff-based trade disruptions, and significant cuts to development and humanitarian aid – weakens the very rules-based order that undergirds Faye’s strategy. These shifts, coupled with more restrictive immigration and aid policies across Western states that often follow U.S. cues, reveal structural vulnerabilities in relying on established international institutions. Conversely, this same Western retrenchment inadvertently reinforces the logic of Traoré’s sovereignty-centered model, which seeks to diversify partnerships toward China, Russia, and other non-Western actors. In an era where Western commitments to global governance appear increasingly uncertain, the appeal of alternative constellations of cooperation gains traction. Yet such diversification also brings long-term dependencies and strategic risks of its own, underscoring that neither model is insulated from the volatility of the broader geopolitical environment.

Towards a New Sahelian Multilateralism

Both Faye’s and Traoré’s models reveal that multilateralism in West Africa is not in retreat; it is undergoing a significant transformation. The region is moving toward a hybrid system in which institutional engagement, South-South cooperation, and selective alignment coexist. This emerging multilateralism is more pragmatic, more sovereignty-conscious, and more reflective of domestic developmental imperatives than earlier models.

The future regional order is therefore unlikely to be organized around a single dominant framework. Instead, it will be shaped by the ability of states to navigate multiple external relationships, reconcile competing narratives of sovereignty, and integrate diverse forms of cooperation into coherent national strategies. Countries like Senegal and Burkina Faso exemplify this diversification, offering alternative templates for how West African states can engage a rapidly evolving global environment.

Their approaches, though distinct, contribute to a broader regional discourse that places African agency at the center of diplomatic decision-making. In this sense, the new multilateralism emerging in West Africa represents not a break from the past but an adaptation to the realities of a more multipolar world, one in which the region can assert its interests with greater confidence and complexity.

Sources

European Union Institute for Security Studies. (2025, February 7). Shifting alliances in West Africa: Measuring Russian engagement and support. https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/shifting-alliances-west-africa-measuring-russian-engagement-support-counter

Human Rights Watch. (2025, December 1). International Criminal Court: Justice at risk. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/12/01/international-criminal-court-justice-at-risk

International Crisis Group. (2025). Defining a new approach to the Sahel’s military-led states. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/burkina-faso-mali-niger/defining-new-approach-sahels-military-led-states

Presidency of the Republic of Senegal. (2025). EU–AU Summit: President Faye advocates renewed multilateralism and peace in Africa. https://www.presidence.sn/en/actualites/eu-au-summit-in-luanda-president-faye-advocates-for-renewed-multilateralism-and-peace-in-africa-1

Varvanyi, A., & Tsurkov, E. (2023). Russia’s growing footprint in Africa’s Sahel region. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/02/russias-growing-footprint-in-africas-sahel-region